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Abstract. This paper examines multi-battle contests whose extensive form can be represented in terms
of a nite state machine. We start by showing that any contest that satises our assumptions decomposes
into two phases, a principal phase (in which states cannot be revisited) and a concluding tie-breaking
phase (in which all non-terminal states can be revisited). Degenerate cases are the nite-horizon contests
on the one hand (e.g., the match race), and the tug-of-war on the other. Next, assuming a probabilistic
technology in each battle, we show that any contest satisfying our assumptions, with either nite or
innite horizon, admits a unique symmetric and interior Markov perfect equilibrium. This entails, in
particular, a complete characterization of the equilibrium in the tug-of-war. Finally, we explore, both
analytically and numerically, the intricate problem of a contest designer that maximizes expected total
e¤ort. In the absence of a complexity constraint, the revenue-maximizing contest is always a match
race, where the optimal length of the race increases as the technology of the component contest becomes
more noisy. If, however, the complexity constraint is binding, then the optimal contest is typically (but
not always) a tug-of-war.
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1. Prerequisites
1.1 Introduction
In a large variety of environments, dynamic contests arise as a natural form of interaction between two
competing parties (Fudenberg et al., 1983; Harris and Vickers, 1987; Roberts and Samuelson, 1988;
Hörner, 2004; Konrad and Kovenock, 2005, 2009; Agastya and McAfee, 2006; Klumpp and Polborn,
2006; Doraszelski and Markovich, 2007; Fu et al., 2015; Häfner, 2017; Karagözoglu et al., 2018). Given
the temporal dimension of the interaction, the winner of the bilateral competition is not determined
immediately, but through a potentially indenite sequence of individual battles. While the literature
has focused mainly on the important special cases of the match race and the tug-of-war, a dynamic
contest may in general be governed by a more elaborate set of rules. For example, while initially, a
start-up may be able to use its seed capital for cost-intensive R&D, it may be forced to give up at
a later stage if lagging behind too much. Similar forms of dynamic contests, in which the conditions
for winning change over time, can be found, for instance, in prolonged political conict (e.g., Organski
and Lust-Okar, 1997), biological struggles (e.g., Reeve et al., 1998), and warfare (e.g., Edwards, 2000).
Still, a exible way to model general dynamical conicts has, to our knowledge, been lacking in the
literature. Moreover, the way in which contestantsincentives for e¤ort provision depend on the rules
of the conict is, overall, not particularly well-understood.
In this paper, we consider a class of dynamic games in which two players repeatedly face each
other in the same type of contest. Following the literature, we will refer to the individual encounter
as a component contest (or battle), and to the overall interaction as a (multi-battle) contest. It will be
assumed that, at each stage of the contest, the history of victories in prior battles determines if the
contest ends and is won by one of the players, or if the contest continues. If the contest ends, then
the prize is allocated. Extending the before-mentioned literature on dynamic contests, we assume that
the contest rules can be dened in terms of a nite state machine (Moore, 1956; Rubinstein, 1986;
Salant, 2011). Since the class of such rules is still quite exible (in particular, too exible to guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium), we impose three assumptions. These assumptions, referred to as
Exchangeability, Monotonicity, and Centeredness, actually impose some structure on the multi-battle
contest. Indeed, as our rst main result shows, any contest that satises our assumptions decomposes
naturally into two phases. In the principal phase that is entered into at the start of the contest, every
state is visited at most once. In the subsequent tie-breaking phase, however, every non-terminal state
1
may be revisited any number of times. Multi-battle contests with nite horizon, such as the match race,
are degenerate in the sense that there is no tie-breaking phase. Another class of degenerate examples
is composed of tug-of-wars that begin directly with the tie-breaking phase. In fact, it turns out that,
under the assumptions that we impose, any tie-breaking phase is isomorphicto a tug-of-war.
Given the salience of the tug-of-war in our characterization result, we consider this particular type of
dynamic contest in some detail. Assuming a battle technology with constant or declining returns, it is
shown that the tug-of-war admits a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, which is necessarily
interior. We also characterize the equilibrium. While the endogenous quantities such as strategies,
conditional winning probabilities, and expected continuation payo¤s may be represented in explicit
form only in special cases, we identify a general (and quite useful) similarity principle of the Markov
perfect equilibrium. This property says that the continuation payo¤s in a tug-of-war with any given
number of states can be easily derived from the continuation values in a tug-of-war with more states.
More generally, we prove the existence of a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for any
multi-battle contest that satises our assumptions. Provided that the contest has a nite horizon, it
is of course the standard backward induction argument that is used to determine equilibrium e¤orts.
The case of contests with a potentially innite horizon is more complicated. Based upon the structural
description of our multi-battle contests, however, the problem reduces to nding an equilibrium in the
tie-breaking phase. Since we know that this is always a tug-of-war, we may build on our previously
obtained structural results for that case. Thereby, we determine expected payo¤s in a large class of
dynamic contests with a potentially innite horizon.
Equipped with the assurance that the Markov perfect equilibrium is unique and with an e¤ective
method to compute the equilibrium for any functional assumption on the battle technology, we examine
the properties of multi-battle contests from the perspective of a designer that aims at maximizing
total expected e¤ort in the multi-battle contest (i.e., across players and across stages, and without
discounting). Blending our limited theoretical results with ndings from extensive numerical analysis,
we arrive at four main conclusions. First, the one-shot contest is actually worse than any dynamic
contest. Second, the optimal unrestricted multi-battle contest is always a match race. Third, the length
of the optimal race is monotonically declining in the decisiveness of the contest technology. Fourth,
if complexity is costly and there is su¢ cient noise, then the tug-of-war tends to dominate any other
contest.
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1.2 Related literature
For an introduction to dynamic contests, see Konrad (2009, Ch. 8) or Szymanski (2003, Sec. 2.6).
Following the ground-breaking work by Fudenberg et al. (1983), a key contribution to the literature
has been Harris and Vickers (1987) who studied the match race and the tug-of-war assuming that each
battle is a probabilistic contest as in Lee and Wilde (1980). They showed existence of a Markov Perfect
Equilibrium for the tug-of-war, and also o¤er conditions su¢ cient for uniqueness.1 Below, we build
on their insights, yet using a di¤erent contest technology. Grossman and Shapiro (1987, rst draft
1985) considered a related model of a race with uncertainty, yet restricted attention to the case of two-
stages. Judd (2003, likewise, rst draft 1985) o¤ers an interesting model of a multi-stage race in which
stochastic progress is measured on a continuous scale. Taylor (1995) allows for incomplete information
in a dynamic research tournament.
After this initial period, both the match race and the tug-of-war have been studied quite thoroughly
under the assumption of a deterministic contest technology. In this case, tie-breaking rules may matter
for the equilibrium outcome. Stipulating that the player with the positive continuation value wins,
Konrad and Kovenock (2005) identied an intuitive equilibrium outcome in which positive levels of
e¤ort are expended only at the initial state. In contrast, Agastya and McAfee (2006), see also McAfee
(2000), assumed that a state is revisited if both e¤orts are zero, and showed that a stalemate of this
type may occur in a Markov perfect equilibrium. In an applied variant of the tug-of-war, McBride and
Skaperdas (2006) assumed that an additional bias supports the initial victor. Fu et al. (2015) point
out that dynamic team contests behave entirely di¤erent than contests between individuals. Häfner
(2017) considered a tug-of-war between groups, where in each stage, a pair of agents is matched under
incomplete information. He nds a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium with interesting comparative
statics. Karagözoglu et al. (2018) were rst in proving existence and uniqueness of a Markov perfect
equilibrium of a tug-of-war with a lottery technology and quadratic costs, which corresponds in our
setting to the special case of a Tullock contest with parameter R = 12 .
2 Correspondingly, our Theorem 2,
including also the similarity principle for continuation payo¤s, extends their equilibrium characterization
1See also the working paper version (Harris and Vickers, 1986), as well as the stochastic-process di¤erence-form formu-
lation of the tug-of-war (Budd et al., 1993).
2Karagözoglu et al. (2018) multiply the rst-order conditions with each other and solve for the equilibrium e¤ort. As
they note, however, that trick works only for the case of quadratic costs. Karagözoglu et al. (2018, p. 22) conclude:
Whether our results generalize to an impact function of the form, f(x) = xr, where r < 1 or 1 < r  2 is far from
trivial, and hence left as an open question.Since their r corresponds to 2R in our notation, Section 4 of the present paper
addresses precisely this open research question.
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in a number of ways. Klumpp and Polborn (2006) considered races with Tullock technology. Assuming
a deterministic contest technology, Konrad and Kovenock (2009) studied races with heterogeneous
deadlines, a potential headstart for one player, and positive intermediate prizes. Multi-player races have
been considered by Do¼gan et al. (2018). None of these contributions, however, uses nite automata to
dene a exible class of dynamic multi-battle contest structures. Neither does any of these contributions
characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium in the tug-of-war for a general class of contest technologies.3
In our setting, the e¤ort provision is the lower the more unbalanced the state. This is in line with
contest models in the tradition of Dixit (1987), for instance. However, in a framework with innitely
many stages and no premature end, Hörner (2004) shows that the leader in a highly unbalanced state
may exert excessive e¤ort so as to keep the follower at a safe distance.
The type of nite state machine introduced below is known as Moore (1956) machines. Rubinstein
(1986) used nite automata to model the strategy choice of boundedly rational players in innitely
repeated non-cooperative games. Salant (2011) employed nite automata to model boundedly rational
choice. In contrast to those papers, we use the Moore machine to model a system of rules for a multi-
battle contest.
1.3 Overview over the paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Multi-battle contests are introduced in Section
2. Section 3 presents the characterization result for multi-battle contests that satisfy our denitions.
The tug-of-war is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 deals with the existence of a unique Markov perfect
equilibrium. Revenue-maximizing contests are studied in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The analysis
of the tug-of-war and other technical derivations have been relegated to an Appendix.
2. Multi-battle contests
2.1 Finite state machines
Two risk-neutral contestants i 2 f1; 2g repeatedly face each other in the same type of component contest
(or battle), until the rules of the game determine that the contest ends, in which case one of the players is
declared the winner and the other is declared the loser. The winner of the multi-battle contest receives
3Dynamic contests are nice objects for experimental analysis as well. Zizzo (2002) tests the race (best-of-19) in the lab.
Deck and Sheremata (2015) o¤er an experimental analysis of the tug-of-war with all-pay technology. Mago and Sheremeta
(2017) implement the race (best-of-three) as an experiment with the all-pay auction as CSF. Dechenaux et al. (2015)
survey the literature.
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a prize of value V > 0, while the loser obtains no prize. Without loss of generality, the prize will be
normalized to one, i.e., V = 1. As mentioned in the Introduction, we will consider multi-battle contest
rules that may be expressed in terms of a nite deterministic state machine.
Denition 1. A multi-battle contest M is composed of:
(i) a nite set of states 
, including an initial state !init 2 
;
(ii) a partition 
 = 
act [ 
1 [ 
2 of 
 into three pairwise disjoint and nonempty subsets 
act, 
1,
and 
2; and
(iii) a transition map  : 
act  f1; 2g ! 
.
Any state ! 2 
act will be referred to as an active state, and any state ! 2 
i, with i 2 f1; 2g, will be
called a winning state for player i. The interpretation is that the multi-battle contest starts (i.e., the
machine begins to run) at time t = 1 at state !1 = !init. Then, for any t  1 such that !t 2 
act, there
is a battle at time t. Depending on the winner it 2 f1; 2g of the battle at time t, the machine transits
into a new state !t+1 = (!t; it). The multi-battle contest ends (i.e., the machine stops) when !t 2 
i
for some i 2 f1; 2g. Then, player i (player j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i) is declared the winner (the loser) of the
multi-battle contest.
The following two examples illustrate the denition.
Example 1 (Match raceor Win-with-M). LetM  1 be an integer. In a match race of length
M , the set of active states is given by 
act = f!(m1;m2) : m1;m2 2 f0; :::;M   1gg, and the initial state
by !init = !(0;0). Terminal states are collected in sets 
1 = f!(M;m2) : m2 2 f0; :::;M   1gg, and 
2 =
f!(m1;M) : m1 2 f0; :::;M   1gg. Further, the transition map is given by (!(m1;m2); 1) = !(m1+1;m2)
and (!(m1;m2); 2) = !(m1;m2+1), respectively, where m1;m2 2 f0; :::;M   1g.
Example 2 (Tug-of-War or Win-by-N). Let N  1 be an integer. In a tug-of-war of (equi-)
distance N , or with (2N   1) active states, it is specied that 
act = f! (N 1); :::; !N 1g, !init = !0,

1 = f!Ng, and 
2 = f! Ng. In this case, the transition map is given by (!n; 1) = !n+1 and
(!n; 2) = !n 1, for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; N   1g.
Thus, in a match race of length M , a player having won M battles wins the multi-battle contest, where
the improper case M = 1 corresponds to the one-shot contest. We will refer to a race of length M
alternatively as a win-with-M . It is easy to see that the maximum number of consecutive battles in
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a race of length M is (2M   1). Therefore, for instance, a race of length M = 2 (of length M = 3)
corresponds to what is known in the literature as a best-of-three (best-of-ve) multi-battle contest. In
the tug-of-war of distance N , however, a player needs to win N battles more than the opponent. Again,
the improper case N = 1 corresponds to the one-shot contest. Note that, for N  2, the tug-of-war has
a potentially innite horizon. We will refer to a tug-of-war of distance N alternatively as a win-by-N .
2.2 Symmetric and minimal contests
It is not di¢ cult to see that two distinct automata may describe multi-battle contests that are iso-
morphicfor the contestants. For example, there could be states in the Moore machine that are never
reached in nite play. Even if all states are reachable, there may be redundancies in the representation.
To make this precise, we introduce the following denitions. Given a multi-battle contestM, let Hi(M)
denote the set of nite histories for each player i 2 f1; 2g that end in a state !T+1 2 
i. We say that
two multi-battle contests M and M0 are equivalent (M  M0 in short) if H1(M) = H1(M0) and
H2(M) = H2(M0).
For a given multi-battle contest M with state space 
, we call the number of elements of 
 the
complexity (M) ofM. Note that the complexity counts not only active, but also terminal states. For
example, the win-with-two (i.e., a race of length two) has a complexity of eight states, because there
are four active and four terminal states. Clearly, by merging terminal states, an equivalent contest can
be found with no more than  = 6 states. This motivates the following denition.
Denition 2. A multi-battle contest M is minimal if, for any multi-battle contest M0 equivalent to
M, we have (M)  (M0).
Assumption 1. The contest is minimal.
This assumption will be tacitly used in the proofs. However, in our illustrations of specic contests, it
proves useful to work with non-minimal contests. Obviously, Assumption 1 is not a limitation at all in
the sense because it is not structural but only about the representation of contests. Note also that, in a
minimal contestM in which both contestants have the opportunity to win, the number of active states
equals (M)  2.
We will focus on multi-battle contests that are ex-ante symmetric for the players.
Denition 3. A multi-battle contest M is called symmetric if there is a bijection  : 
 ! 
 such
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that (i) (!init) = !init, (ii)  induces a bijection from 
1 onto 
2, and (iii) ((!; i)) = ((!); j)
for any ! 2 
act and i; j 2 f1; 2g with j 6= i.
The interpretation of the symmetry condition is straightforward. Since, by Assumption 1, every state is
reachable from the initial state !init, a straightforward induction argument may be used to show that, if
a multi-battle contest is symmetric, then the bijection  is unique. We will call a state ! 2 
 balanced
if (!) = !.
For instance, in Example 1, the mapping  maps any state !(m1;m2) 2 
 to !(m2;m1). In particular,
a state !(m1;m2) is balanced if and only if m1 = m2 2 f0; :::;M   1g. Similarly, in Example 2, the
mapping  maps any state !n 2 
 to ! n. Moreover, state !n is balanced if and only if n = 0.
Assumption 2. The contest is symmetric.
2.3 Component contests
Given e¤ort levels x1  0 for player 1 and x2  0 for player 2, consider a battle with stage payo¤s
1(x1; x2) = p(x1; x2)V1   x1 (1)
2(x1; x2) = (1  p(x1; x2))V2   x2, (2)
where V1 and V2, respectively, are player 1s and player 2valuations, and p : R+  R+ ! [0; 1] is the
contest success function (CSF), capturing the probability that contestant 1 wins the battle. Constant
unit costs are assumed for expositional simplicity. Indeed, as usual, the consideration of continuously
di¤erentiable, convex and strictly increasing cost functions that vanish at zero e¤ort can be accomplished
by a simple transformation of the e¤ort variable.
A CSF is called concave if p(; x2) is concave on R+, for any x2  0; and strictly concave (in the
interior) if p(; x2) is strictly concave on R+, for any x2 > 0. The CSF p is strictly monotone (in the
interior) if p(bx1; x2) > p(x1; x2), for any bx1 > x1  0, and x2 > 0; anonymous if p(x2; x1) = 1 p(x1; x2),
for any x1  0 and x2  0; di¤erentiable (in the interior) if @p(x1; x2)=@x1 exists and is continuous
for any x1  0 and x2 > 0; competitive if p(0; x2) = 0 for any x2 > 0; homogeneous (of degree zero)
if p(x1; x2) = p(x1; x2) for any  > 0, x1  0, and x2  0. Following the elegant treatment of Baik
(2004), Malueg and Yates (2005, 2006), amongst others, we will impose the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The component CSF is concave, strictly monotone, anonymous, continuously di¤er-
entiable, competitive, and homogeneous.
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Dene auxiliary functions f(y) = p(y; 1) and (y) = f(y)  yf 0(y). Then, f is strictly increasing, twice
di¤erentiable, and concave, and satises the functional equation f(1=y) = 1  f(y).4 Moreover, () is
continuous and strictly increasing, with (0) = 0 and   (1) 2 (0; 12).
We may express equilibrium e¤orts and payo¤s in terms of the CSF as follows.
Lemma 1. Impose Assumption 3. Then the probabilistic contest admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
if and only if either (i) V1 > 0 and V2 > 0, or (ii) V1  0 and V2  0. If the equilibrium exists, it is
unique. In case (i), equilibrium e¤ort levels are given by
x1 = V2f
0

V2
V1

and x2 = V1f
0

V1
V2

, (4)
and equilibrium payo¤s are given by
1 = V1(
V1
V2
) and 2 = V2(
V2
V1
). (5)
In particular, equilibrium payo¤s are positive. In case (ii), x1 = x2 = 0, 1 = V1=2 and 2 = V2=2.
There is a wide variety of probabilistic specications that are consistent with Assumption 3. Some
examples are listed below.
Tullock CSF. Following Tullock (1980), one may assume that player 1s probability of winning is given
as pTUL(x1; x2) = xR1 =(x
R
1 + x
R
2 ) for some R 2 (0; 1], with the convention that the ratio is read as
1=2 if x1 = x2 = 0. For the Tullock case, fTUL() =
R
1+R
with derivative f 0TUL() = R
R 1
(1+R)2
, and
TUL() = 
R(R+1 R)
(1+R)2
. For R = 1, this CSF is a simple lottery.5
Serial CSF . Let  2 (0; 1). Player 1s probability of winning is given as pSER(x1; x2) = 1  12 (x2=x1)
if x1  x2, and by pSER(x1; x2) = 12 (x1=x2) if x1 < x2. Again, we have the convention that the ratio
x1=x2 is read as 1=2 if x1 = x2 = 0. This specication has been introduced by Alcalde and Dahm
(2007).
Relative-di¤erence CSF . Finally, let pRD(x1; x2) =
(1+)x1+(1 )x2
2(x1+x2)
, where  2 (0; 1]. This specication
is a special case of a functional form introduced by Beviá and Corchón (2015). It corresponds to a
4 Indeed,
f(
1
x
) = p(
1
x
; 1) = p(1; x) = 1  p(x; 1) = 1  f(x). (3)
5The case R 2 (1; 2) may lead to battles in which one of the players randomizes, while the case R  2 renders each
battle equivalent to an all-pay auction. In both cases, one of the two players ends up with a zero expected payo¤s, which
leads to strategic considerations covered, in essence, already by Agastia and McAfee (2006) and Konrad and Kovenock
(2005).
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convex combination of a Tullock contest with parameter R = 1, which receives a weight of  , and a coin
toss, which receives a weight of 1   .
However, the di¤erentiability condition in Assumption 3 excludes the all-pay auction, which has been
studied before by Agastya and McAfee (2006) and Konrad and Kovenock (2005). The homogeneity
assumption excludes lotteries with noise, as studied by Blavatskyy (2010), for instance. Homogeneity
is crucial for our analysis of the tug-or-war, so we have presently no way of including such cases, even
though it seems plausible that our results should extend. The main reason for Assumption 3 is that we
can thereby ensure existence of a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Histories, strategies, and Markov perfect equilibrium
By a nite history h, we mean a nite sequence (i1; i2; :::; iT ) of players in f1; 2g (where it is interpreted
as the winner of the t-th battle), such that there is a nite sequence (!1; !2; :::; !T+1) of states in 

satisfying (i) !1 = !init, and (ii) !t 2 
act with !t+1 = (!t; it), for any t 2 f1; :::; Tg. In this case, we
will say that h is of length T  0 and ends in state !T+1. Denote by H the set of all nite histories
h. Similarly, an innite history h consists of a sequence fitg1t=1, such that there is a sequence f!tg1t=1
satisfying (i) !1 = !init, and (ii) !t 2 
act with !t+1 = (!t; it), for any t 2 N  f1; 2; :::g. A terminal
history h is either a nite history of length T such that !T+1 2 
1 [ 
2, or an innite history. A
nite history h 2 H given by nite sequences (i1; i2; :::; iT ) is a subhistory of some history h0 of length
T 0 2 fT; T + 1; :::g[f1g given by (nite or innite) sequences (i01; i02; :::) if it = i0t for any t 2 f1; :::; Tg.
We call a state ! 2 
 reachable if there is a nite history h 2 H ending in ! = !T+1. A recurrent state
! 2 
 is a state that can be visited more than once during play.
Let Hact  H denote the set of histories h 2 H that end in an active state !T+1 2 
act. A pure
strategy i : Hact ! R+  [0;1) for player i species an action xi = i(h)  0 for any h 2 Hact.
We denote by Si the set of pure strategies for contestant i 2 f1; 2g. Given a nite history h 2 H,
we consider the set Hterm(h) of terminal histories that have h as a subhistory. Then, given a pair of
pure strategies (1; 2) 2 S1  S2, and given a contest success function fpi(; )gi=1;2, we may dene the
outcome of the game as the probability distribution over Hterm(h) induced by (1; 2).6
6While Hterm (h) is an innite set, there are no hidden technical obstacles here. To understand why, note that Hterm (h)
may be understood as a projection of the product space f1; 2gN, where we identify two points if they go through the same
terminal state. Since the projection is surjective, we obtain a sigma eld on Hterm (h) in a natural way, and may consider
the push-forward measure on the image space Hterm (h).
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Given a nite terminal history and a nite sequence of e¤ort choice
((x11; x
1
2); :::; (x
T
1 ; x
T
2 )) 2 R2T+ , (6)
we assign payo¤ 1  PTt=1 xit to a multi-battle contest-winning player i, and similarly,  PTt=1 xit to a
multi-battle contest-loser player i, at any nite terminal history of length T . Further, payo¤ 12 
P1
t=1 x
i
t
is assigned to player i from any innite terminal history.
Given a nite history h 2 H, and a pair of pure strategies (1; 2), player is continuation payo¤ at
h is the expectation of terminal payo¤s over the resulting outcome.7 A pair of pure strategies (1; 2) is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium if, for any nite history h ending in !T+1 2 
act, each player i 2 f1; 2g
maximizes her continuation payo¤ at !T+1 by choosing i(h). A pure strategy is Markovian if i(h)
may depend on the nite history h only through the most recent state !T+1 (Ericson and Pakes, 1995;
Maskin and Tirole, 2001). A subgame-perfect equilibrium is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) when
it employs Markovian strategies. We call an MPE interior if players exert a positive e¤ort at all active
states.
3. Characterization result
3.1 Assumptions
It turns out that, for general multi-battle contests, a MPE need not exist (for examples, see Section 5).
To avoid this non-existence problem, and also because we had the impression that not all multi-battle
contests make sense (i.e., the denition appeared to us as being still too exible), we will impose the
following three assumptions.
Assumption (E for Exchangeability). For any ! 2 
act such that !0  (!; 1) 2 
act and
!00  (!; 2) 2 
act, we have (!0; 2) = (!00; 1).
Assumption (M for Monotonicity). For any ! 2 
act and i 2 f1; 2g, there is a nite sequence
!1; :::; !L with L  1 such that (i) !1 = !, (ii) !l 2 
act with !l+1 = (!l; i), for l 2 f1; :::; L   1g,
and (iii) !L 2 
i.
7This expected payo¤ exists in the extended real line R [ f 1g because a contestants expected revenues are nite.
Indeed, a contestant may not collect more prize money than V = 1. However, since the contest is repeated, and the outcome
of each battle uncertain, there is no upper limit to the contestants total of ex-post delivered e¤orts. Economically, it should
be obvious that no player ever nds it optimal to choose a pure strategy that leads to a negative expected payo¤. We may
therefore assume, without loss of generality, that the continuation payo¤ is nite.
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Assumption (C for Centeredness). There is at most one state ! 2 
 that is both recurrent and
balanced.
Exchangeability captures the requirement that any two nite histories that di¤er only in the order in
which the last two contests have been won end up in the same state. For instance, Exchangeability
would hold within a tennis game, but it would fail to hold in a tennis match considering points as
battles. To understand why, suppose that, at a score of 40:15 in the rst game of the match, the server
makes a point and wins the game, but loses the rst point of the next game, so that the score is 1:0
0:15. This is certainly a situation that strategically di¤ers from the one reached if the server rst loses
and then wins a point, resulting in the score 1:0 0:0. The possibility that a tennis match can be won
with less than half of the total points is well-known, of course.8
Next, Monotonicity says that, starting from any active state, winning all battles in a row will let you
win the multi-battle contest. Monotonicity implies, in particular, that in order to win the multi-battle
contest, a player must necessarily win the last battle. We will later see that this assumption is crucial for
equilibrium existence. It may also be noted that Monotonicity combined with Exchangeability excludes
multi-battle contests in which the outcome is determined by simple majority. Indeed, this would be
pointless because the winner may be determined before the last battle.9
Finally, Centeredness says that there is at most one balanced state that may be revisited after a
sequence of battles. As we show below, both Exchangeability and Monotonicity are indispensable for
equilibrium existence. Centeredness, however, does not seem crucial for existence but dropping it leads,
as will become clear below, to a less intuitive class of multi-battle contests.
3.2 Strongly connected components
A state ! 2 
 is called nite if there exists T  = T (!)  0 such that, for any nite history h ending
in ! = !T+1, we have T  T  We will say that a multi-battle contest has a nite horizon if each state
is nite. Conversely, a multi-battle contest that does not possess a nite horizon will be referred to as
having an innite horizon. A strongly connected component (SCC) is a maximal subset C  
act with
the properties that (i) C has at least two elements, and (ii) any state ! 2 C can be reached from any
other state !0 2 C. Clearly, an SCC consists of recurrent states only.
Lemma 2. A multi-battle contest has an innite horizon if and only if it has an SCC.
8Wright et al. (2013) estimate that this anomaly occurs in approximately 5 percent of all tennis matches.
9This would change, however, if stage prizes are admitted. See Section 7 for discussion.
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Proof. Immediate from the denitions. 
3.3 Statement of the result
The following is the rst main result of this paper. It is crucial for our analysis of general multi-battle
contest structures.
Theorem 1. Impose Assumptions (E), (M), and (C). Then, either the multi-battle contest has a nite
horizon, or there is precisely one multi-battle contest-ending tug-of-war that is reached after a maximum
nite number of steps.
Two simple classes of contests that are consistent with the prediction of Theorem 1 are the following.
Example 3 (Win-with-M-or-by-N) This nite-horizon contest may be thought of as a match
race of length M  2 that is ended prematurely if one of the contestants has an advantage of at least N
points over the opponent. Note that for N  M , this is equivalent to a race of length M . Conversely,
if N = 1, then we have a one-shot contest. Therefore, we will assume that N 2 f2; :::;M   1g. The
simplest non-trivial case is the win-with-three-or-by-two, which is illustrated in Figure 1(a).
Example 4 (Win-with-M-and-by-N) This innite-horizon contest may be thought of as a match
race of length M  2 that is continued until one of the contestants has an advantage of at least N
points over the opponent. For N  M , this is equivalent to a tug-of-war of distance N . Conversely,
if N = 1, then we have a match race. Therefore, we will assume again that N 2 f2; :::;M   1g. The
simplest non-trivial case, the win-with-three-and-by-two, is illustrated in Figure 1(b).10
Figure 1. (a) Win-with-3-or-by-2; (b) Win-with-3-and-by-2
10A another example is the win-with-four-and-by-two, which captures the counting system in a tennis game.
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In the remainder of this subsection, we prove Theorem 1. The proof is based on a sequence of lemmas.
Suppose rst that the multi-battle contest has an innite horizon. Then, by Lemma 2, there exists an
SCC.
For states !, !0 2 
 and a player i 2 f1; 2g such that (!; i) = !0, we say that the move from ! to !0
is irreversible if there is no nite sequence (i1; i2; :::; iT ) of players in f1; 2g (where it is the winner of the
t-th battle) and a nite sequence (!1; !2; :::; !T+1) of states in 
 such that (i) !1 = !0, (ii) !T+1 = !,
and (iii) !t 2 
act with !t+1 = (!t; it), for any t 2 f1; :::; Tg. The following lemma shows that any
irreversible move leading away from any state in an SCC leads to a terminal state.
Lemma 3. Impose Assumptions (E) and (M). Suppose that ! 2 
 is recurrent and that the move to
!0  (!; 1) is irreversible. Then !0 is terminal.
Proof. Since ! is recurrent, it is contained in some SCC C (see Figure 1 for illustration). We claim
that !0 = (!; 1) is terminal. Suppose not. Then !0 2 
act. Moreover, since ! is recurrent, and
the move to !0 is irreversible, !00 = (!; 2) 2 C must be recurrent. In particular, !00 2 
act. By
Exchangeability, (!0; 2) = (!00; 1)  !000. Further, by Monotonicity, a player winning a battle and
ending the multi-battle contest must win the multi-battle contest. Hence, it is impossible that !000 is
a terminal state. Hence, !000 2 
act. Next, since the move from ! to !0 is irreversible, so is the move
from ! to !000. But, ! and !00 lie in the same SCC. Hence, the move from the recurrent state !00 to
!000 = (!00; 1) is irreversible. By induction, and the niteness of the state space, there is an iteration,
at which a repeated win for player 2 leads back to !. This, however, is in conict with Monotonicity.
The claim follows. 
Figure 2. Proof of Lemma 3.
Thus, any state that is reached by an irreversible move from a recurrent state is terminal. To prove
the Theorem, it remains to be shown that (i) there cannot be more than one SCC in the multi-battle
contest, and (ii) any symmetric SCC is a tug-of-war.
13
Lemma 4. Impose Assumptions (E) and (M). Let C be an SCC. Then C can be reached from any
active state ! 2 
act. In particular, there is at most one SCC in the multi-battle contest.
Proof. Note that Monotonicity implies that !0 2 
act. To provoke a contradiction, suppose that there
is some active state ! 2 
act such that C cannot be reached from !. By Assumption 1, however, ! can
be reached from !0, i.e., there is a nite sequence of states !1; :::; !K and of players i0; ::; iK 1 2 f1; 2g
such that (i) !k 2 
act for k = 1; :::;K   1, (ii) !k+1 = (!k; ik) for k = 0; :::;K   1, and (iii)
!K = !. Since C can be reached from !0, but cannot be reached from !, there must be some index
k 2 f0; :::;K   1g such that C can be reached from !k but not from !k+1. Without loss of generality,
ik = 1. Since !k 2 
act, and invoking Monotonicity, there is a nite sequence b!1; :::; b!L with L  1
such that (i) b!1 = !k, (ii) b!l+1 = (b!l; 2) for l 2 f1; :::; L   1g, and (iii) b!L 2 
2. Note now that
!k+1 = (!k; 1) 2 
act. If (!k; 2) is terminal, then we have a contradiction (because there is no SCC
at all reachable from !k). Therefore, b!2 = (!k; 2) is active, and we have by Exchangeability a state
(b!2; 1). By Monotonicity, the state (b!2; 1) is active. From (b!2; 1), we cannot reach C, because this
would imply we can reach C from !k+1, which is not true. However, we can reach C from b!2. By
induction, we see that only repeated battle wins by player 2 can bring us from !k to C, and that just
one battle win of player 1 on the way leads us to states from which C cannot be reached anymore. But
this means that any path in C consists of wins of player 2 exclusively. However, this is inconsistent with
Monotonicity! This proves the rst assertion. The second assertion follows directly from the rst using
Lemma 3.
Figure 3. Proof of Lemma 4.
The following lemma, which crucially exploits the symmetry of the contest, identies an important
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structural property of the tie-breaking phase.
Lemma 5. Impose Assumptions (E) and (M). Then any SCC contains a balanced state. If, in addition,
Assumption (C) holds, then the SCC is a tug-of-war.
Proof. Recall that !0 has the property that (!0) = !0. If (!0; 1) is terminal, then there is no
SCC, and we are done. Therefore, (!0; 1) is active. By Symmetry, the same is true for (!0; 2).
Therefore, by Exchangeability, !1  ((!0; 2); 1) = ((!0; 1); 2). By monotonicity, !1 is active.
Moreover, (!1) = !1. If (!1; 1) is terminal, then there is no SCC, and we are done (indeed, if
(!1; 1) is terminal, then ((!0; 1); 1) is terminal by Monotonicity. By a symmetry argument, (!1; 2)
is terminal as well and hence again, ((!0; 2); 2) is terminal by Monotonicity. This shows that all
paths lead to a terminal state in nitely many steps, i.e., there indeed exists no SCC in this case).
Thus, (!1; 1) is active. By Symmetry, the same is true for (!1; 2). Therefore, by Exchangeability,
!2  ((!1; 2); 1) = ((!1; 1); 2). By monotonicity, !2 is active.
Figure 4. Proof of Theorem 2
Repeating this argument, we have an innite sequence of active states f!kg1k=0 such that (!k) = !k
for any k. Since the state machine has only nitely many states, there is a state !k in that sequence
that belongs to the SCC. This proves the rst assertion of the theorem.
Assume next that there is precisely one state ! 2 C such that (!) = !. Clearly, ! 2 
act. By
Monotonicity, there is a nite sequence !1; :::; !L with L  1 such that (i) !1 = !, (ii) !l 2 
act with
!l+1 = (!l; 1) for l 2 f1; :::; L   1g, and (iii) !L 2 
1. Moreover, there is a nite sequence b!1; :::; b!K
with K  1 such that (i) b!1 = !, (ii) !k 2 
act with b!k+1 = (b!k; 2) for k 2 f1; :::;K   1g, and
(iii) !K 2 
2. By Symmetry, L = K, and (!2) = b!2. If L = 2, then any immediate successor of
! is terminal, and we obtain a contradiction. Thus, L > 2. In this case, however, !2 and b!2 are
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active, and Exchangeability implies that (!2; 2) = (b!2; 1). Note that this state is balanced, so that
(!2; 2) = (b!2; 1) = !. Thus, if L = 3, then we are done. If L > 3, then we can iteratively use
Exchangeability to see that (!l+1; 2) = !l and that (b!k+1; 2) = b!k. This proves the second assertion,
and hence, the lemma. 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
3.4 Tightness
We conclude this section with two examples that illustrate the tightness of our assumptions.
Example 5. The multi-battle contest shown in Figure 5 below satises Exchangeability and Monotonic-
ity. Lemma 5 shows, however, that the SCC appearing in Figure 5 cannot be a SCC. This SCC is actually
symmetric, but it does not contain a balanced state. Thus, Assumption 1 (symmetry) is crucial for
obtaining the conclusion of Lemma 5.
Figure 5. An SCC without balanced state.
Example 6. Figure 6 shows two SCCs with more than one balanced state. Thus, these multi-battle
contests are inconsistent with Centeredness. The SCC in panel (a) may be reduced to a tug-of-war,
but note that the Markov property is more stringent in the reduced automaton. The SCC in panel (b)
cannot be reduced to a tug-of-war.
Figure 6. Two SCCs that violate Centeredness.
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4. The tug-of-war
The analysis above implies a central role for the tug-of-war in the analysis of multi-battle contests that
can be represented by a nite state machine. In this section, we will prove that the tug-of-war admits
a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. We also characterize the equilibrium. Our analysis
builds upon Harris and Vickers (1987), but in contrast to their work, we will admit a di¤erent class of
technologies for the component contests.
Figure 7. Continuation payo¤s in the tug-of-war
Considered is a tug-of-war of distance N  1, as introduced in Example 2. Thus, there are 2N   1
active states ! (N 1); :::; !N 1, and two terminal states !N 2 
1 and ! N 2 
2. The initial state is
!init = !0. Let Vn;N denote the valuation, i.e., the continuation payo¤, of a state !n 2 
 for player 1.
Similarly, for player 2, the continuation payo¤ of state !n 2 
 is denoted by vn;N .
As we show in the Appendix, a Markov perfect equilibrium exists in the tug-of-war. To ensure
uniqueness, however, and to characterize the equilibrium, we will impose one more assumption.
Assumption 4. (1=)(1 ()) is strictly declining in  2 (0; 1).
The assumption captures a property of the component CSF that is crucial for constructing the Markov
perfect equilibrium in the tug-of-war. Specically, Assumption 4 ensures that, from the ratio of di¤er-
ences in continuation payo¤s in the transition between two states state, one may uniquely determine the
ratio of valuations in any of the two corresponding component battle. Assumption 4 imposes an upper
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bound on the curvature of the technology, which holds for any of the before-mentioned specications of
CSF.
Lemma 6. The Tullock, serial, and relative-di¤erence CSF all satisfy Assumption 4.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
We are now in the position to characterize the equilibrium of the tug-of-war.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Let N  1 be a positive integer. Then, the
following holds true for the tug-of-war with 2N   1 active states:
(i) the tug-of war has a unique symmetric MPE;
(ii) Vn;N is strictly increasing in n 2 f N; :::; Ng, while vn;N is strictly declining in n 2 f N; :::; Ng;
(iii) the symmetric equilibrium payo¤ V0;N = v0;N is strictly declining in N ;
(iv) for any xed integer n  0, equilibrium e¤orts Xn;N for player 1 and xn;N for player 2 are strictly
declining in N 2 fn + 1; n + 2; :::g, and symmetrically, for any xed integer n < 0, equilibrium e¤orts
Xn;N for player 1 and xn;N for player 2 are strictly increasing in N 2 f:::; n  2; n  1g;
(v) for i 2 f1; 2g, player is probability of winning in any active state !n is independent of N 2
fn+ 1; n+ 2; :::g.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Theorem 2 establishes existence and uniqueness of the symmetric and interior Markov perfect equilib-
rium for a tug-of-war with an odd number of active states and constant or decreasing returns. Figure
7 illustrates equilibrium continuation payo¤s at active states in a tug-of-war of distance N = 4. These
continuation values are identied recursively as the unique solution of a nonlinear equation. For R = 1,
each of these nonlinear equations is quadratic, so that an explicit solution is feasible.11
Example 7. For the case of the lottery technology (i.e., Tullock CSF with parameter R = 1), and a
11The derivations are detailed in the Appendix.
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distance N = 2, we get the following equilibrium continuation payo¤s at active states:
V0;2 = v0;2 =
p
33  5
4
= 0:18614 (7)
V1;2 =
385  65p33
16
= 0:72521 (8)
v1;2 =
27
p
33  155
16
= 6:4495 10 3 (9)
The monotonicity of equilibrium continuation values predicted by Theorem 2(ii) is evident from these
numbers.
The analysis conducted in the Appendix identies an unexpected similarity principle across tug-of-wars
with di¤erent N , which is that
Vn;N   Vn 1;N = Vn;N+1   Vn 1;N+1
VN;N+1   V N;N+1 (10)
holds for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; Ng. Thus, continuation payo¤s known for the tug-of-war with a larger
number of active states may be used to compute continuation payo¤s for a tug-of-war with a smaller
number of active states. For instance, scaling Example 7 down to N = 1, relationship (10) implies for
and n = 0 that
V0;1 = V0;1   V 1;1 = V0;2   v1;2
V1;2   v1;2 = 0:25, (11)
which indeed corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium payo¤ in the one-shot lottery contest. Clearly,
this property is inherited from our assumption that the contest success function is homogeneous of
degree zero. As a result of the similarity property, the symmetric equilibrium payo¤ V0;N in the tug-
of-war is monotone also in N , as stated in Theorem 2(iii). For instance, the rent dissipation in the
win-by-2 is always stronger than in one-shot contest, and similarly, the rent dissipation in the win-by-3
is always stronger than in a win-by-2. This is remarkable because the analogous property for the match
race does not hold.
The proof of Theorem 2 that we o¤er in the Appendix proceeds algebraically, i.e., we solve the
system of Bellman equations in a recursive way. This actually seems necessary because the abstract
transformation that maps a vector of continuation payo¤s, via the Bellman equations, into a new vector
of continuation payo¤s does not seem to possess any convenient properties. For instance, it is not a
contraction. We also found that the Jacobian of this transformation is not a P-matrix, so that uniqueness
is not guaranteed by the usual conditions for univalence. To see that the equilibrium strategies predicted
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by state-by-state optimization are immune against arbitrary deviations, we verify that the tug-of-war
without discounting satises a suitable variant of the one-stage deviation principle.
5. Existence and uniqueness
Our second main result is the following.
Theorem 3. Impose Assumptions 1-4 and (E), (M), and (C). Then, the multi-battle contest admits a
unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium is interior.
Proof. We start by showing that at every active state, the continuation payo¤ for every player at each
state lies in the open interval (0; 1). Consider rst the case where the contest has a nite horizon. Thus,
there is an integer L  0 such that the longest nite history has length L. Clearly, L  1. Indeed,
if L = 0, then !init is terminal, say !init 2 
1. But then, by Assumption 2, (!init) 2 
1 \ 
2 = ?,
a contradiction. Hence, L  1, as claimed. The proof proceeds now by induction. Suppose rst that
L = 1. Then, there is precisely one active state, which is !init. From Monotonicity, there is an interior
equilibrium. Suppose that the claim has been shown for any nite-horizon contest of length  L   1.
Take any ! such that the longest nite history in the subgame starting at ! has length L. There are
three cases. Assume rst that there is another battle at !0 = (!; 1) 2 
act, but !00 = (!; 2) is
terminal, as illustrated in panel (a) of Figure 8. Since state !00 is terminal, Monotonicity implies that
player 1s payo¤ at !00 is zero and it su¢ ces to show that valuation at !0 is positive. However, given
that the longest nite history in the subgame starting at !0 has length at most L  1, this follows from
the induction hypothesis. The situation is similar in a second case, where !0 = (!; 1) is terminal,
while !00 = (!; 2) 2 
act. See as panel (b) of Figure 8 for illustration. Here, by Monotonicity, it must
be that !0 2 
1, and contestant 1s continuation payo¤ is one. Conversely, if player 1 loses and there
is another battle at !00 = (!; 2), then by the induction hypothesis, player 1s continuation payo¤ is
strictly below one. In a third case, neither !0 nor !00 is terminal, as illustrated in panel (c) of Figure 8.
Then, by Exchangeability, (!0; 2) = (!00; 1), and player 1s continuation payo¤ at !0 must be strictly
higher than player 1s continuation payo¤ at !00. Therefore, at !, player 1 has a positive valuation of
winning. Analogous arguments can be made for player 2, of course, which proves the claim for the case
of contests with nite horizon.
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Figure 8. Proof of Theorem 3.
Consider next the case where the contest has an innite horizon. Then, we may replace the continuation
payo¤s at any state in the concluding SCC by the unique and interior equilibrium payo¤s of the cor-
responding tug-of-war of some distance N  2. By Theorem 2 (ii), player 1s continuation payo¤ Vn;N
is strictly increasing, and player 2s continuation payo¤ vn;N is strictly declining in n 2 f N; :::; Ng.
The proof proceeds now precisely as above by backward induction. This proves the claim. To see that
the identied prole of Markov strategies constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium (i.e., allowing for
unilateral deviations that a¤ect e¤ort levels at more than one battle), one may use the same arguments
as in the proof of Theorem 2. 
The following examples show that existence breaks down in general when the assumptions of Exchange-
ability and Monotonicity are dropped.
Example 8. Consider the multi-battle contest depicted in panel (a) of Figure 9, and suppose that
R = 1 with Tullock technology. This contest does not admit a Markov perfect equilibrium. Indeed, in
the initial battle, contestants ght about whether the remaining interaction will be a one-shot contest
(if 2 wins the rst battle) or a win-with-2 (if 1 wins the rst battle). The one-shot contest is known
to yield a payo¤ of 0:25 for each contestant, the win-with-two a payo¤ of 0:18 for each contestant.
Therefore, player 2 has a negative valuation of winning, so she exerts no e¤ort. Player 1, conversely, has
a positive valuation of winning, and would not want to leave the outcome to any symmetric tie-breaking
rule. So player 1 has no best response. As a result, an equilibrium does not exist. While the example
is asymmetric, it is simple to make it symmetric, so it is really assumption (E) that does the job here.
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Figure 9. Multi-battle contests without MPE
Example 9. The multi-battle contest shown in panel (b) of Figure 9 is an example of nonexistence
when Monotonicity does not hold, while Exchangeability holds.
Konrad and Kovenock (2009) dene an important property of multi-battle contests which they refer to
as pervasiveness. In short, pervasiveness means that, starting from any state corresponding to n1 wins
of player 1 and n2 wins by player 2, one reaches with positive probability any other state corresponding
to n
0
1 wins of player 1 and n
0
2 wins by player 2 provided that n
0
1  n1 and n02  n2. This property holds
for any multi-battle contest in our class as well.
Corollary 1. Any multi-battle contest satisfying Assumptions (E), (M), and (C) is pervasive.
6. Optimal multi-battle contests
6.1 Theoretical results
In this section, we explore the intricate issue of nding the optimal dynamic structure of multi-battle
contests. Of course, the degree to which the extensive form of a contest may be shaped by a third
party depends on the application considered. E.g., in a sports contest, the designer has essentially
full discretion (maybe up to constraints with respect to timing or players levels of exhaustion). In
contrast, a regulatory body that aims at maximizing the e¤ort expended in R&D activities will likely
face a variety of policy constraints. All the more, the regulators inuence on the extensive form of
competition will often be quite indirect. In our analysis below, however, we will abstract from such
application-specic considerations.
The designer is assumed to maximize expected total e¤orts. Thus, we sum e¤orts both across players
and across periods. In particular, no discounting is applied. Similar objective functions have been used
in the literature (e.g., Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Groh et al., 2006, Sec. 3.2). Note that, given that
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the prize will be allocated with probability one, we may equivalently assume that the designer aims at
minimizing the playerssymmetric expected equilibrium payo¤ in the symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 7. Maximizing expected total e¤orts is equivalent to minimizing symmetric expected equilibrium
payo¤s in the contest.
Proof. Let  = 1 = 2 denote the symmetric equilibrium payo¤. Then,  =
1
2   e, where e
denotes the total expected payo¤ per player. The claim is now immediate. 
We can now show the following.
Theorem 4. The one-shot contest is dominated by any contest in which two consecutive battle wins at
the beginning of the contest imply a win of the contest.
Proof. Take any contest in which two consecutive battle wins at the beginning of the contest imply
a win of the contest. We denote by  the continuation value of the contest after each player has won
precisely one battle. Clearly,  < 1=2. Then, the continuation payo¤ for a player that has lost the rst
battle is
v  ( 
1   ) > 0, (12)
while the continuation payo¤ for the player having won the initial battle is
V   + (1  )(1  

) < 1: (13)
Therefore, in the initial battle of the contest, the symmetric equilibrium payo¤ is given by
 = v +  (V   v) . (14)
We claim that
v +  (V   v) <  (15)
, v
1  V <

1   . (16)
Plugging in the expressions for v and V , we obtain
 <  (17)
, v
1  V <

1   (18)
, (

1  )
(1  )  1  (1  ) < 1   . (19)
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By Assumption 4, the left-hand side is strictly increasing in . Moreover, for  = 1=2, the left-hand
side is identical to the right-hand side. This proves the claim, and hence, the Theorem. 
The theorem shows that a very large class of dynamic contests elicits higher expected total e¤orts
than the one-shot contest. Intuitively, this is so because even the two-fold repetition of the component
contest allows making double-use of the same incentive. The conclusion of Theorem 4 can be extended
by recalling that the one-shot contest is a degenerate form of the tug-of-war. Since we have shown that
symmetric equilibrium payo¤s in the tug-of-war are strictly declining in the number of active states,
it follows that the one-shot contest is dominated, in terms of total e¤ort, also by any non-degenerated
tug-of-war. In fact, we conjecture that the one-shot contest minimizes expected total e¤orts across all
contests. This is also suggested by the results of our numerical analysis which will be reported below.
6.2 Numerical exploration
In the numerical analysis, we employed several specications. For the Tullock case, the well-known
equilibrium characterization (Nti, 1999) yields
TULi =
V R+1i (V
R
i + (1 R)V Rj )
(V R1 + V
R
2 )
2
(i; j 2 f1; 2g; j 6= i), (20)
provided that V1 > 0 and V2 > 0. The parameter was chosen from the grid R 2 f0:01; :::; 1:00g. In the
case of the serial specication, Alcalde and Dahm (2007) have shown that
SER1 = V1

1  1 + 
2

V2
V1

and SER2 = V2
1  
2

V2
V1

, (21)
provided that V1  V2 > 0. In this case, the parameter was chosen from the grid  2 f0:01; :::; 0:99g,
i.e., excluding the case  = 1 which implies complete rent dissipation for the contestant with the lower
valuation. The relative di¤erence CSF yields equilibrium payo¤s
RDi = Vi

V 2i
(V1 + V2)2
+
1  
2

(i 2 f1; 2g). (22)
In this case, the parameter was chosen from the grid  2 f0:01; :::; 1:00g.
To compare the expected equilibrium payo¤ across contests, we needed a way to enumerate all
designs with a nite or innite horizon. As for the nite-horizon contests, we considered multi-battle
contests for which the longest sequence of consecutive battles feasible has length (2K+1), where K  1
is an integer. One can convince oneself that the number TK of dynamic contests with longest path
(2K + 1) that satisfy our assumptions corresponds to the number of nondecreasing integer sequences
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0  x1  x2  :::  xK 1 satisfying xk  k for any k 2 f1; ::::;K   1g. For instance, for K = 1, there
is only the best-of-three (or win-with-two) multi-battle contest. For K = 2, there are two contests, the
best-of-ve (or win-with-three) contest, and the win-with-three-or-by-two contest. For larger values of
K, the number of contests increases quickly. In fact, one can show (e.g., Pemantle and Wilf, 2009) that
TK corresponds to the k-th Catalan number, i.e., TK = 1K+1
 
2K
K

, with T1 = 1, T2 = 2, T3 = 5, T4 = 14,
and asymptotic approximation TK  4KK3=2p . To enumerate all possible multi-battle contests, we chose
a recursive programming approach that conveniently solves the issue of an endogenous loop depth.
As for the contests with innite horizon, these can likewise be enumerated by replacing the payo¤s in
the nal active states of dynamic contests with nite horizon by the corresponding continuation payo¤s
of a tug-of-war with an odd number of active states. Figure 1(b) illustrates this idea. Note that the
minimality assumption implies that the states of the concluding tug-of-war can always be arranged in
the inverted L-shape. Altogether, we explored the set of (i) all nite-horizon contests that end after at
most 29 battles, and (ii) all innite-horizon contests in which a recurrent state is reached after at most
26 battles. The computations were done using Visual Basic.
6.3 Unconstrained contests
In our rst analysis, we assume that the choice set is the entire set of multi-battle contests satisfying
our assumptions. It follows from Theorem 2 that the one-shot contest is always strictly suboptimal.
In fact, any tug-of-war can be strictly improved by replacing it by a longer variant. We now have the
following, as we believe, interesting numerical nding.
Finding 1. The revenue maximizing multi-battle contest is always a match race of length M  2.12
To understand intuitively why the race is optimal compare the two contests shown in Figure 10. Suppose
that player 1 wins the initial battle in contest (a), so that state !(1;0) is reached. Then, to win the
contest, player 1 just needs one more win (at least), while player 2 would need three wins in any case.
In contest (b), however, the analogous situation looks less unbalanced. Thus, the continuation value
for player 1 at state !(1;0) is higher in contest (a) than in contest (b). For player 2, the situation is the
opposite, i.e., the continuation value for player 2 at state !(1;0) is lower in contest (a) than in contest
(b). Because of this, the net valuation of winning the initial battle is higher in contest (a) than in
12We have checked this for the Tullock, serial, and relative di¤erence specications, going through all nite-horizon
contests that end after 12 or less consecutive battle wins by the same player. In the case of the Tullock contest, we allowed
for an arbitrary concluding tie-breaking phase with up to 21 recurrent states.
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contest (b), whereas the continuation value for the loser of the initial battle is lower in contest (a) than
in contest (b).
Figure 10. Optimality of the match race
It turns out that the expected payo¤ in the contest shown in Figure 10a, w=3_b=2, is always weakly
higher than the expected in the best-of-ve contest shown in Figure 10b, w=3. Analytically, this seems
like a very hard problem.
For our analysis, the relative size of the changes in the continuation values across players matters.
Specically, it turns out that the change in continuation values between contests (a) and (b) is much
larger for player 1 than for player 2. In other words, the leading player 1 gains, in relative terms, much
more than the lagging player 2 loses. We call this the preemption e¤ect. As a result, the equilibrium
payo¤, i.e., the continuation payo¤ at state !init = !(0;0) is higher in contest (a) than in contest (b).
In turn, this implies that contest (a) is always suboptimal from the perspective of an e¤ort-maximizing
designer. Thus, the intuitive reason for the optimality of the race is that, among all multi-battle contests,
it minimizes the preemption e¤ect by making a battle-win as incremental a progress towards winning
as feasible. The one-shot multi-battle contest, however, is never optimal. The intuitive reason for this
is that a repetition allows a double-use of the same prize incentives, which is impossible in a one-shot
contest.
6.4 The optimal length of a race
Given that a match race is always optimal, the question is which length is best for a designer that
maximize the expected total e¤ort. Figure 11 illustrates that the length of the optimal race is inversely
related to the Tullock parameter. Thus, intuitively, if each the contest success function reects more
randomness (i.e., a lower R), then it is preferable for the contest designer to involve contestants into a
longer race. We have found the same prediction for the serial and relative di¤erence contest.
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Finding 2. The revenue-maximizing length of a match race is monotonically increasing in the noise.
Figure 11. Expected total e¤ort in a Tullock race, as a function of R
6.5 Contests subject to a complexity bound
In many environments, the scope for changing the rules of the contest will be more limited than assumed
above. Suppose, therefore, that the contest designer is restricted to use a multi-battle contest such that
the number of active states is no larger than a given number K  1. Below, we report the results for
the Tullock contest.
For K 2 f1; 2g, we obtain the one-shot contest. There is no other symmetric multi-battle contest
under this complexity constraint.
For K = 3, we need to compare the one-shot contest with a win-by-2. As shown in the observation,
however, rent dissipation in the tug-of-war with three active states is always strictly higher than in the
one-shot contest. Thus, for K = 3, the win-by-2 is always optimal.
For K = 4, we have the win-with-2 as an additional possibility. Numerically, the win-with-2 strictly
dominates the win-by-2 if and only if R  0:89. Intuitively, this nding captures the trade-o¤ for the
contest designer. If randomness is important (R low), then the designer has an incentive to have long
multi-battle contest, so as to reward small but continued e¤orts provision. If, however, the constraint of
the number of states is binding, then the tug-of-war, with its potentially innite horizon, o¤ers a better
trade-o¤ than the race.
For K 2 f5; 6g, the designer has the win-by-3 as an additional option. This is numerically optimal if
R < 0:95, otherwise the match race is better. This makes sense because the contest designer will make
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use of the relaxed complexity constraint.
For K = 7, there are two additional possibilities, the win-by-4, that always dominates smaller tug-
of-wars. Further, we have a win-with-3-or-by-2 (Example 4). Optimal is the win-by-4 for R < 0:95, and
the win-with-2 otherwise. The win-with-3-or-by-2, however, is never optimal.
For K = 8, the win-by-4 remains optimal for R < 0:85, while the win-with-two (i.e., best-of-three)
stays optimal for R  0:95. In between, it is optimal to use a win-with-3-and-by-2 (Example 3).
For K 2 f9; 10g, the win-by-5 becomes optimal for R < 0:74, while the win-with-two stays optimal
for R > 0:98. In between, it is optimal to use a win-with-three (i.e., a match race of length three).
For K 2 f11; 12g, the win-by-6 replaces the win-by-5.
For K = 13, the win-by-7 replaces the win-by-6.
For K = 14, it is optimal to use a win-with-4-or-by-3 when R 2 [0:67; :::; 0:76].
Thus, for R 2 (0; 1] small, the numerical always analysis nds a tug-of-war to be optimal, whereas
for R 2 (0; 1] large, the complexity constraint relaxes, and we nd a match race. For intermediate values
of R, there are cases (e.g., K = 8 and K = 14) in which we get sporadic contests that are optimal
but neither a tug-of-war nor a match race. We have continued the analysis to state machines with
up to K = 28 active states, but this pattern remained unchanged. Recalling the relationship between
complexity and the number of active states to be K = (M)   2, we may summarize our results for
complexity-constrained optimal contests as follows.
Finding 3. Let the complexity  = (M) be given. Then, for any R not too large, the complexity
bound is binding and the optimal multi-battle contest of complexity  is the longest tug-of-war that can
be realized with complexity :
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced three conditions that jointly dene a exible and, as we believe, natural
class of symmetric multi-battle contests. This class includes both dynamic contests with nite horizon,
such as the win-with-N contest, also known as the best-of-(2N 1) tournament, as well as contests with
innite horizon, such as a the tug-of-war. We propose making use of a nite state machine to obtain a
well-dened class of dynamic contests that can then be analyzed. It was shown that any multi-battle
contest in our class has a very simple structure. Moreover, provided that the contest technology satises
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our assumptions, we established that any multi-battle contest admits a unique symmetric and interior
Markov perfect equilibrium.
As part of the analysis, we characterized the Markov perfect equilibrium of the tug-of-war. This
complements results in the existing literature. While we used the characterization result for the tug-of-
war predominantly as the basis for our numerical analysis of more general contests with innite horizon,
the result addresses also a long-standing open research question, and therefore may be of independent
interest.
Finally, we have studied the optimal design of dynamic contests, where the designer sets the rules
so as to maximize total aggregate e¤ort. For this type of problem, there is still a regrettable lack of
analytical methods, and so we had to resort to numerical methods. Despite this di¢ culty, the optimal
design problem could be seen to balance a trade-o¤between three natural forces in multi-battle contests:
(i) lower incentives due to randomness in the contest technology, (ii) a double-use of incentives, and
(iii) the discouragement e¤ect in unbalanced states. The standard race was seen to optimally balance
this trade-o¤ for a variety of contest success function if the complexity of rules is no concern for the
designer. Moreover, the length of the optimal race was shown to increase monotonically in the degree of
randomness in the contest technology. However, once there is a positive shadow cost of complexity, the
tug-of-war is typically the optimal choice. Taken together, these ndings shed light on the determinants
of optimal dynamic contests.
There are some natural extensions that we chose to not address in this paper. To begin with, one
could consider heterogeneous valuations of the multi-battle contest prize. That case, however, would
be more demanding. For instance, we conjecture that the Markov perfect equilibrium of the tug-of-war
might not be unique in that case. Next, Denition 1 could be generalized to account for, say, ties in
the outcome of an individual contest, or ties in the outcome of the dynamic contest. We did not pursue
this line of research because we perceive the multi-battle contest as an instrument to avoid precisely
any kind of tied outcomes. Further, there might be random transitions between states. For instance,
in Figure 4, an initial coin toss could determine the active state from which interaction starts. We
conjecture that, incorporating such possibilities would complicate matters substantially (e.g., because
it would be di¢ cult to capture Centeredness) without yielding additional insights. Finally, one could
think about having a variety of sets of nal states, with di¤erent prize allocations in each of those. In
that case, our assumptions would appear intuitively too tight, however. For example, in a promotional
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competition, or in a series of presidential debates, the prize allocation is usually not of a binary nature,
which upholds incentives for candidates in most scenarios even if the number of battles is xed ex-ante
and independent of the outcome of individual battles.
Appendix A. Analysis of the tug-of-war
Let N  1 be an arbitrary positive integer. We consider a tug-of-war with 2N   1 active states
! (N 1); :::; ! 1; !0; !1; :::; !(N 1), (23)
and two terminal states !N 2 
1 and ! N 2 
2 (cf. Example 2). The contest success function will be
kept xed throughout.13
We start with the uniqueness part. Suppose that a Markov perfect equilibrium exists. We denote
by Vn;N and vn;N , respectively, player 1s and player 2s continuation payo¤s at state !n, for any
n 2 f N; :::; Ng. In particular, VN;N = v N;N = 1 and vN;N = V N;N = 0. Moreover, we let
n;N = Vn;N   Vn 1;N , (24)
n;N = vn 1;N   vn;N , (25)
for n 2 f (N   1); :::; Ng, denote the change in continuation payo¤s for players 1 and 2, respectively,
when moving from state !n 1 to !n. As our rst lemma shows, both n;N and n;N are positive, which
corresponds to the intuitive idea that winning a battle strictly raises (strictly lowers) the winners (the
losers) continuation payo¤.
Lemma A.1 In any Markov perfect equilibrium of the tug-of-war of distance N , we have n;N > 0
and n;N > 0 for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; Ng.
Proof. Consider any active state !n, i.e., n 2 f (N 1); :::; (N 1)g. In the Markov perfect equilibrium,
the respective e¤ort choices Xn;N for player 1 and xn;N for player 2 must form a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the one-shot contest with valuations Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N for player 1 and vn 1;N   vn+1;N
for player 2. Moreover, by Lemma 1, for the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to exist in the one-shot
contest, we need either (i) Vn+1;N Vn 1;N > 0 and vn 1;N vn+1;N > 0, or (ii) Vn+1;N Vn 1;N  0 and
13The consideration of tug-of-wars with an even number of active states is obsolete for our analysis. We conjecture,
however, that the methods developed below would allow to deal with that case as well.
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vn 1;N   vn+1;N  0. In case (i), the equilibrium characterization of the one-shot contest (cf. Lemma
1) yields the Bellman equations
Vn;N = Vn 1;N + (Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N )  

Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N
vn 1;N   vn+1;N

, (26)
vn;N = vn+1;N + (vn 1;N   vn+1;N )  

vn 1;N   vn+1;N
Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N

. (27)
Given that equilibrium payo¤s are positive in the one-shot contest, this implies that Vn;N > Vn 1;N
and vn;N > vn+1;N . Moreover, in this case, Xn;N > 0 and xn;N > 0, so that Vn;N < Vn+1;N and
vn;N > vn+1;N , which proves the claim. In case (ii), Xn;N = xn;N = 0 by Lemma 1, and consequently,
each of the two players wins with equal probability in state !n. Therefore, Vn+1;N  Vn;N  Vn 1;N and
vn+1;N  vn;N  vn 1;N . By arguments detailed in case (i), this sequence of weak inequalities may be
continued to both sides until VN;N  :::  V N;N and vN;N  :::  v N;N , which is impossible because
of VN;N = v N;N = 1 and vN;N = V N;N = 0. This concludes the analysis of case (ii), and proves the
lemma. 
Given Lemma A.1, we may dene the ratio of changes in continuation payo¤s when moving from !n 1
to !n,
n;N =
n;N
n;N
> 0, (28)
for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; Ng, as well as the ratio of net valuations at any active state !n,
n;N =
n;N + n+1;N
n;N + n+1;N
> 0, (29)
i.e., for n 2 f (N   1); :::; (N   1)g. The following relationship exploits that the contest technology is
homogeneous of degree zero, so that the ratio of net valuations at any active state uniquely determines
the corresponding ratio of changes in continuation payo¤s.
Lemma A.2 In any Markov perfect equilibrium of the tug-of-war with 2N 1 active states, continuation
payo¤s satisfy
n;N = n;N   (1=n;N )
1   (n;N ) , (30)
for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; (N   1)g.
Proof. Fix n 2 f (N   1); :::; (N   1)g. Using the notation introduced above, equations (26) and (27)
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may be rewritten as
n;N = (n;N + n+1;N )  

n;N + n+1;N
n;N + n+1;N

, (31)
n+1;N = (n;N + n+1;N )  

n;N + n+1;N
n;N + n+1;N

. (32)
It now follows from (32) that
n;N = (n;N + n+1;N )  n+1;N (33)
= (n;N + n+1;N ) 

1  

n;N + n+1;N
n;N + n+1;N

. (34)
Dividing by (31), we obtain
n;N
n;N
=
n;N + n+1;N
n;N + n+1;N

1  

n;N+n+1;N
n;N+n+1;N



n;N+n+1;N
n;N+n+1;N
 . (35)
The claim is now immediate. 
The following lemma shows that, for any n;N 2 (0; 1), there is a unique value for n;N 2 (0; 1) that
solves equation (30).
Lemma A.3 For any  2 (0; 1), the mapping  : [0; 1]! [0; 1] dened through
() =
(
  (1=)1 () if  > 0
 if  = 0
(36)
has a unique xed point   '(). Moreover, the xed point is interior, i.e., '() 2 (0; 1).
Proof. Since
lim
&0


1


= lim
&0
(1  2f() +  ()) = 1, (37)
the mapping (:) is a continuous self-mapping on the unit interval. Hence, there certainly exists a xed
point. This xed point must be interior because 0 and 1 are not xed points. Indeed, (0) =  > 0,
and
(1) =   
1   < 1, (38)
since  < 12 . Finally, the xed point 
 satises the relationship
 (1   ())
 (1=)
= , (39)
and hence, must be unique by Assumption 4. 
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We will need the following auxiliary result.
Lemma A.4 Assumption 3 implies (x) + (1=x) < 1, for any x > 0.
Proof. Recall that
f(
1
x
) = 1  f(x). (40)
Taking the derivative of (3) yields
  1
x2
f 0(
1
x
) =  f 0(x) (41)
) f 0( 1
x
) = x2f 0(x). (42)
Therefore,
(
1
x
) = f(
1
x
)  1
x
f 0(
1
x
) (43)
= 1  f(x)  xf 0(x). (44)
From the above,
(x) + (
1
x
) = f(x)  xf 0(x) + 1  f(x)  xf 0(x) (45)
= 1  2xf 0(x) (46)
< 1, (47)
because f is strictly monotone and concave on R+. 
The parameters n;N and n;N are now determined recursively, starting from the balanced state !0.
Lemma A.5 In any symmetric Markov Perfect equilibrium of the tug-of-war with 2N  1 active states,
0;N = 1 (48)
n+1;N = '

n;N   (n;N )
1   (1=n;N )

(n 2 f0; :::; N   2g). (49)
Moreover, given Assumption 4, n+1;N < n;N for any n 2 f0; :::; N   2g.
Proof. Fix N  1. Then
0;N =
0;N + 1;N
0;N + 1;N
(50)
=
(v 1;N   v0;N ) + (v0;N   v1;N )
(V0;N   V 1;N ) + (V1;N   V0;N ) (51)
=
v 1;N   v1;N
V1;N   V 1;N . (52)
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Clearly, in any symmetric MPE, v 1;N = V1;N and v1;N = V 1;N . Hence, 0;N = 1, proving (48). To
prove the recursion, let n 2 f0; :::; N   2g. Then, n + 1 2 f1; :::; N   1g, so that by Lemma A.2, we
know that
n+1;N = n+1;N   (1=n+1;N )
1   (n+1;N ) . (53)
Assume for the moment that n+1;N < 1. Then, equation (53) says that n+1;N is the unique xed-
point of the mapping n+1;N dened in the statement of Lemma A.3. In this case, therefore, n+1;N =
' (n+1;N ). To verify (49), it therefore su¢ ces to show that n+1;N < 1, and that
n+1;N = n;N   (n;N )
1   (1=n;N ) . (54)
For this, we divide (31) by n;N + n+1;N > 0, and get
n;N
n;N + n+1;N
=  (1=n;N ) . (55)
Taking the reciprocal on both sides and subsequently subtracting one, this becomes
n+1;N
n;N
=
1   (1=n;N )
 (1=n;N )
. (56)
Similarly, starting from (32), we get
n;N
n+1;N
=
1   (n;N )
 (n;N )
. (57)
Multiplying (57) with (56), and rearranging, we obtain
n+1;N
n+1;N
=
n;N
n;N
  (n;N )
1   (1=n;N ) 
 (1=n;N )
1   (n;N ) . (58)
By Lemma A.2, we know that
 (1=n;N )
1   (n;N ) =
n;N
n;N
. (59)
Plugging this into equation (58), we arrive at
n+1;N
n+1;N| {z }
=n+1;N
=
n;N
n;N| {z }
=n;N
  (n;N )
1   (1=n;N ) 
n;N
n;N
, (60)
which yields (54). Finally, Lemma A.4 guarantees that
 (n;N ) +  (1=n;N ) < 1. (61)
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Hence, n;N  1 and equation (54) imply that n+1;N < 1. This proves the the rst part of the lemma.
To prove the second part, let n 2 f0; :::; N   2g. Then, (49) implies that
n+1;N = n;N   (n;N )
1   (1=n;N )
 (1=n+1;N )
1   (n+1;N ) . (62)
Re-writing yields
n;N (n;N )
1   (1=n;N ) =
n+1;N (1   (n+1;N ))
 (1=n+1;N )
. (63)
To provoke a contradiction, suppose that n+1;N  n;N . Then, by Assumption 4,
n+1;N (1   (n+1;N ))
 (1=n+1;N )
 n;N (1   (n;N ))
 (1=n;N )
. (64)
Combining the last two inequality delivers
n;N (n;N )
1   (1=n;N ) 
n;N (1   (n;N ))
 (1=n;N )
, (65)
which reduces to
1   (n;N ) +  (1=n;N ) . (66)
But this is in conict with Lemma A.4. The contradiction proves the second part of the lemma, which
concludes the proof. 
Next, we consider ratios
bn;N = n;N
0;N
(n 2 f0; 1; :::; Ng), (67)
bn;N = n;N
1;N
(n 2 f1; :::; Ng). (68)
where, in any symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, 0;N = V0;N   V 1;N = v0;N   v1;N = 1;N .
The following lemma allows to recursively compute bn;N and bn;N from the previously determined
parameters n;N .
Lemma A.6 We have b0;N = b1;N = 1, and
bn+1;N = bn;N  1   (1=n+1;N )
 (1=n+1;N )
(n 2 f0; 1; :::; N   1g), (69)
bn+1;N = bn;N   (n+1;N )
1   (n+1;N ) (n 2 f1; :::; N   1g). (70)
Proof. By denition, b0;N = b1;N = 1. Further, the recursive relationships (69) and (70) follow
immediately from equations (56) and (57), respectively. 
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Lemma A.7 Let N  1. Then, continuation payo¤s in any symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium
satisfy
Vn;N =
PN
=1
b;N +Pn=1 b;NPN
=1
b;N +PN=1 b;N (n = 0; :::; N) (71)
vn;N =
PN
=n+1
b;NPN
=1
b;N +PN=1 b;N (n = 0; :::; N). (72)
Proof. We start by rewriting the sums appearing in equations (71) and (72). This yields for any
n 2 f0; :::; N + 1g
Xn
=1
b;N = 1
0;N
Xn
=1
;N (73)
=
1
0;N
Xn
=1
(V;N   V 1;N ) (74)
=
Vn;N   V0;N
0;N
(75)
=
Vn;N   V0;N
1;N
. (76)
In particular, for n = N , we obtain
XN
=1
b;N = 1  V0;N
1;N
. (77)
Similarly,
XN
=n+1
b;N = 1
1;N
XN
=n+1
;N (78)
=
1
1;N
XN
=n+1
(v 1;N   v;N ) (79)
=
vn;N   vN;N
1;N
(80)
=
vn;N
1;N
, (81)
In particular, for n = 0, XN
=1
b;N = v0;N
1;N
. (82)
Plugging this all in the right-hand side of (71), and subsequently eliminating the common denominator
1;N , delivers PN
=1
b;N +Pn=1 b;NPN
=1
b;N +PN=1 b;N = v0;N + Vn;N   V0;Nv0;N + 1  V0;N = Vn;N , (83)
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as claimed. In an analogous fashion, we obtainPN
=n+1
b;NPN
=1
b;N +PN=1 b;N = vn;Nv0;N + 1  V0;N = vn;N . (84)
This proves the lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) (Uniqueness) Note that Lemma A.7 above settles uniqueness of the symmet-
ric Markov perfect equilibrium. (Existence) From the continuation payo¤s identied above, a candidate
equilibrium may be constructed in a straightforward way. Indeed, by the virtue of Lemma 1, it su¢ ces
to set equilibrium e¤orts for player 1 and 2, respectively, at any active state !n equal to
Xn;N = (vn 1;N   vn+1;N )f 0

vn 1;N   vn+1;N
Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N

, (85)
xn;N = (Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N )f 0

Vn+1;N   Vn 1;N
vn 1;N   vn+1;N

, (86)
where n 2 f (N   1); :::; (N   1)g. Clearly, this denes a symmetric and interior strategy prole with
the property that unilateral deviations at a given nite history are not protable. It remains to be
shown that, in the spirit of the one-stage deviation principle, simultaneous deviations at any set of
histories are not protable. For this, note that the opponents strategy is xed and interior. Moreover,
since a deviating player never exerts an e¤ort in a battle in excess of the value of the prize for the
entire contest, it may be assumed that e¤orts in each battle are taken from the interval [0; 1]. Suppose
that a pure strategy exists that grants a player an expected payo¤ of at least " > 0 higher than the
expected payo¤ in the candidate equilibrium. Then, there is a time T such that, for any given length
of play exceeding T , the deviators probability for winning the contest after T stages is strictly smaller
than ". Therefore, there exists a protable deviation with nite horizon as well, and hence, a protable
deviation at a single state. Thus, we have established existence as well, which concludes the proof of
part (i) of Theorem 2.
(ii) Recall that V n;N = vn;N and v n;N = V n;N , for any n 2 f0; :::; Ng. Therefore, it clearly
su¢ ces to prove, in view of Lemma A.7, that bn;N > 0 for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng, and that bn;N > 0 for any
n 2 f1; :::; Ng for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng. Now, a straightforward induction argument involving Lemmas
A.3 and A.5 shows that n;N > 0 for any n 2 f0; :::; N   1g. Therefore, via Lemma A.6, it follows that,
indeed, bn;N > 0 for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng, and bn;N > 0 for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng.
This delivers part (ii).
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(iii) As illustrated in Figure 7, when moving from state !n 1 to !n, for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng, player
1s increase in the continuation payo¤ when moving one state to the right is always larger in absolute
value than player 2s corresponding loss in the continuation payo¤. Formally,
n;N
n;N
= n;N < 1, (87)
for any n 2 f1; :::; Ng, as has been checked in the proof of Lemma A.5. Therefore, the symmetric
equilibrium payo¤ indeed declines strictly in N . This proves part (iii).
(iv) From equations (85-86) and the similarity principle, player 1s and player 2s respective equi-
librium e¤orts Xn;N and xn;N in each active state !n are strictly declining in N , i.e., Xn;N+1 < Xn;N
and xn;N+1 < xn;N for any n 2 f (N   1); :::; N   1g. This proves (iv).
(v) As the ratio of e¤orts does not change, i.e., xn;N+1=Xn;N+1 = xn;N=Xn;N for any n 2 f (N  
1); :::; N   1g, winning probabilities at active states do not change in the transition from N to N + 1.
This proves part (v), and hence, the theorem. 
The next lemma is a formal statement of the similarity principle mentioned in the body of the paper.
Lemma A.8 (Similarity property) The parameters n;N , bn;N , and bn;N do not depend on N .
Proof. By Lemma A.5, have 0;N = 1 for any N  1. Since the recursion does not depend on N , the
parameter n;N does not depend on N either. The other claims are now immediate from Lemma A.6.

Details on Example 7. In the case of the Tullock CSF with parameter R = 1, the xed point
identied by Lemma A.3 admits the explicit representation
'1() =
1
4
p
1 + 8  1

. (88)
Hence, 0 = 1, and
1 = '(
20
2 + 0
) = '(
1
3
) =
p
33
12
  1
4
= 0:22871. (89)
Moreover, b0 = b1 = 1, and
b1 = b0  0  (2 + 0) = 3, (90)
b2 = b1  1  (2 + 1) = 3p33  5
8
= 1:5292, (91)
b2 = b1  21
1 + 21
=
5
p
33  27
48
= 3:5892 10 2. (92)
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Finally, from Lemma A.7,
V0;2 = v0;2 =
b1 + b2b1 + b2 + b1 + b2 =
p
33  5
4
= 0:18614, (93)
V1;2 =
b1 + b2 + b1b1 + b2 + b1 + b2 = 385  65
p
33
16
= 0:72521, (94)
v1;2 =
b2b1 + b2 + b1 + b2 = 27
p
33  155
16
= 6:4495 10 3, (95)
which concludes the derivation of the continuation payo¤s in the case N = 2. 
Appendix B. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 6
Proof of Lemma 1. If p is constant, then anonymity implies p  0:5, so that x1 = x2 = 0. Moreover,
1 = V1=2 > 0 and 2 = V2=2 > 0, which proves the claim in this case. Assume, therefore, that p is
not constant. For that case, Malueg and Yates (2005, Lemma 1) have shown that any pure-strategy
equilibrium satises x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. For  > 0, we may dene f() = p(; 1). Then we have by
homogeneity that
1(x1; x2) = f(
x1
x2
)V1   x1 (96)
2(x1; x2) = f(
x2
x1
)V2   x2 (97)
for any x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. The necessary rst-order conditions for an interior optimum read
f 0(
x1
x2
)
V1
x2
  1 = 0 (98)
f 0(
x2
x1
)
V2
x1
  1 = 0 (99)
Combining anonymity with homogeneity, we get
f(
x1
x2
) + f(
x2
x1
) = 1, (100)
for any x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. Di¤erentiating w.r.t. x1 yields
1
x2
f 0(
x1
x2
)  x2
x21
f 0(
x2
x1
) = 0, (101)
so that (a variant of Eulers Lemma)
f 0(
x2
x1
) = f 0(
x1
x2
)

x1
x2
2
, (102)
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for any x1 > 0 and x2 > 0. Evaluating at x1 = x1 and x2 = x2, and combining the resulting relationship
with (98) and (99), we arrive at
x1
x2
=
V1
V2
, (103)
as in Baik (2004) and Malueg and Yates (2005). Moreover, from (98),
x1 = V2f
0(
V2
V1
) (104)
= V2f
0(
V1
V2
)

V1
V2
2
(105)
= V 21
@p(V1; V2)
@x1
. (106)
Analogously, for player 2,
x2 =  V 22
@p(V1; V2)
@x2
= V 22
@p(V2; V1)
@x1
, (107)
as claimed. Thus, we have shown that, provided that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, it is
unique and given by e¤orts (106) and (107). To see that these e¤ort levels constitute a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, note that the equilibrium payo¤ function for player 1,
e1(x1) = p(x1; x2)V1   x1 (108)
is concave on R+. Hence, given that the rst-order condition holds, x1 is indeed a global maximum ofe1. Finally, it is obvious that equilibrium prots are positive if the CSF is noncompetitive. To see that
equilibrium payo¤s (5) are positive if the CSF is strictly concave, recall that a player can always ensure
a nonnegative payo¤ by choosing an e¤ort of zero. Since x1 > 0 is the unique interior maximum, strict
concavity implies that 1 > 0. A similar argument shows that 2 > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 6. In the Tullock case, TUL () = 
R(R+1 R)
(1+R)2
, with R 2 (0; 1], so that
TUL (1=)
TUL (1   ()) =
 R( R + 1 R)
 (1 +  R)2 (1  R(R+1 R)
(1+R)2
)
(109)
=
R( R + 1 R)
 (1 + R)2 (1  R(R+1 R)
(1+R)2
)
(110)
=
R( R + 1 R)
 (1 + R)2   R(R + 1 R) (111)
=
1

R(1 R) + 1
R(1 +R) + 1
, (112)
which is indeed strictly declining.
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In the case of the serial contest with parameter  2 (0; 1), we have SER(x) = 1  1+2 x  if x  1,
and SER(x) = 1 2 x
 if x < 1. Note that this is a continuous function (not di¤erentiable though). To
check if Assumption 4 holds, we note that for x  1,
SER(1=x)
x(1  SER(x)) =
1 
2 x
 
x(1+2 x
 )
=
1  
x(1 + )
, (113)
which is strictly declining in x, and for x < 1,
SER(1=x)
x(1  SER(x)) =
1  1+2 x
x(1  1 2 x)
, (114)
with derivative
@
@x
SER(1=x)
x(1  SER(x)) = ( 4) 
(2  x)2 + (4  x)2x
x2(1  1 2 x)2
< 0. (115)
Thus, Assumption 4 holds also for the serial contest.
In the case of the relative di¤erence contest with parameter  2 (0; 1], we have
RD(x) =
x2
(x+ 1)2
+
1  
2
: (116)
To check that Assumption 4 holds, we note that
RD(1=x)
x(1  RD(x)) =

(x+1)2
+ 1 2
x

1  x2
(x+1)2
  1 2
 (117)
=
 + 1 2 (x+ 1)
2
x
  
1  1 2

(x+ 1)2   x2 (118)
=
(1  )x2 + 2(1  )x+ 1 + 
x((1  )x2 + 2(1 + )x+ 1 + ) , (119)
Brute-force derivation shows that
@
@x
RD(1=x)
x(1  RD(x))
=  x(x
3 + 4x2 + 4)(1  )2 + 6x2(1  2) + 16x + (1 + )2
x2 ((1  )x2 + 2(1 + )x+ 1 + )2 (120)
< 0 (121)
Thus, Assumption 4 holds also for the relative di¤erence contest. 
Appendix C. Details on the contest specications used in the paper
Tullock. If p(x1; x2) = pTUL1 (x1; x2), then the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is given by e¤ort
levels
xTUL1 =
RV R+11 V
R
2
(V R1 + V
R
2 )
2
and xTUL2 =
RV R1 V
R+1
2
(V R1 + V
R
2 )
2
. (122)
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Moreover, equilibrium payo¤s are given as
TUL1 =
V R+11 (V
R
1 + (1 R)V R2 )
(V R1 + V
R
2 )
2
and TUL2 =
V R+12 (V
R
2 + (1 R)V R1 )
(V R1 + V
R
2 )
2
. (123)
Serial. If p(x1; x2) = pSER1 (x1; x2), then the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, if V1  V2, is given
by e¤orts
xSER1 =
V1
2

V2
V1

and xSER2 =
V2
2

V2
V1

. (124)
Moreover, payo¤s are given as
SER1 = V1

1  1 + 
2

V2
V1

and SER2 = V2
(1  )
2

V2
V1

. (125)
Cf. Alcalde and Dahm (2007, Th. 3.4).
Relative-di¤erence CSF. We have
fRD(x) =
x
x+ 1
+
1  
2
, (126)
RD(x) =
x
x+ 1
+
1  
2
  x
(x+ 1)2
(127)
=
x2
(x+ 1)2
+
1  
2
. (128)
This yields equilibrium e¤orts
xRD1 =
V 21 V2
(V1 + V2)2
and xRD2 =
V1V
2
2
(V1 + V2)2
, (129)
and
RD1 = V1

V 21
(V1 + V2)2
+
1  
2

and RD2 = V2

V 22
(V1 + V2)2
+
1  
2

. (130)
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